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Abstract
This report describes our effort to model and verify the
Casper blockchain finality system in the Coq proof assistant.
We outline the salient details on blockchain systems using
Casper, describe previous verification efforts we used as a
starting point, and give an overview of the formal definitions
and properties proved. The Coq source files are available at:
https://github.com/runtimeverification/casper-proofs
1 Introduction
The Ethereum blockchain and platform [18] is increasingly
used as a financial transaction mechanism, in particular by
way of smart contracts. A desirable property of a transac-
tion mechanism is durability—after a user has submitted a
transaction and received initial confirmation, the transaction
should not be rolled back. However, in a blockchain system,
there may be several competing chains of blocks that agree
on the transaction history from the initial genesis block only
up to some point. These so-called forks may arise as a result
of network delays or adversarial behavior by some nodes,
and can lead to transactions disappearing as soon as one of
the forks is preferred by most nodes. To address the problem
of long-ranging blockchain revisions, Buterin and Griffith
proposed Casper [11], a finality system that overlays another
block chain such as Ethereum. When enough participants in
the system are honest, Casper defends both against active
attacks and catastrophic crashes.
For the greatest confidence, proofs about Casper should be
formalized in a mechanical proof assistant, to ensure there
are no unstated assumptions or invalid steps. This report
describes our effort to model and verify Casper in the Coq
proof assistant, both at the abstract protocol level and at the
level of a distributed blockchain system. In the terminology
of Appel et al. [7], the aim is to make the Casper specification
two-sided: implementable in Ethereum nodes and provably
beneficial to Ethereum users. A further goal is to lay the
foundation for making the Casper specification live, i.e., en-
able verifying Ethereum nodes at the level of executable
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code, or even generating the code from the specification,
correct-by-construction.
2 Background
This section explains blockchain and Casper terminology,
provides pertinent Coq background, and describes the previ-
ous formalization and verification efforts we build upon.
2.1 Blockchain and Casper Terminology
Abstractly, the global state in a blockchain system is a block
forest, with a unique genesis block that is the root of a special
block tree. Trees not rooted in the genesis block may be possi-
ble but are typically disregarded. As new blocks arrive to the
system, nodes in the system continually establish consensus
on a canonical blockchain defined by one of the leaves in
the special block tree. New blocks are minted through a pro-
posal mechanism, which could be an underlying blockchain
using proof-of-work [16] or proof-of-stake [9] to regulate
block creation. Participating nodes use a local fork choice rule
to decide where to construct a new block onto the current
block tree. Due to, e.g., delays or adversarial behavior, there
may be competing leaf blocks of similar tree height, defining
different blockchain forks.
Casper overlays a blockchain system, and intuitivelyworks
by engaging a group of autonomous validators who attest to,
by broadcasted votes, that certain blocks in the special tree
belong to the designated canonical blockchain. To participate,
validators must demonstrate that they have a stake in the
blockchain system by locking up a deposit of the blockchain’s
cryptocurrency. The deposit will be slashed if the validator
is verifiably reported by other validators to be behaving
adversarially.
For verification, we focus on two properties of Casper that
were proved informally in [11](i.e. without using a mechani-
cal proof assistant): accountable safety and plausible liveness.
Accountable safety intuitively states that conflicting blocks
in different block tree forks cannot both be finalized if more
than 23 of validators (by deposit) behave honestly. Plausible
liveness states that regardless of what has happened before,
it is always possible to continue to finalize blocks when more
than 23 of validators follow the protocol.
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2.2 Casper Formalizations
Yoichi Hirai formalized and verified several earlier variants
of Casper in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [15]. These for-
malizations are highly abstract, in the sense that they ignore
most details of the structure of hashes, blocks, and validators.
For example, the requirements on the fractions of honest
validators is captured, via Isabelle’s locale mechanism [8],
by postulating abstract types ′q1 and ′q2 to represent col-
lections of sets of validators of at least 23 weight and sets of
validators of at least 13 weight respectively. Instead of any
numerical details, the Isabelle formalization just assumes the
key intersection property, that any two set of validators each
of at least 23 have a common subset of weight at least
1
3 . This
is how that property was expressed in Isabelle:∧
q1 q2 . ∃q3 . ∀v .v ∈2 q3 → v ∈1 q1 ∧v ∈1 q2
Here,
∧
is all-quantification, the subscripted operatorv ∈1 q
means that validator v is a member of a set q which belongs
to the type ′q1 that represents sets of weight at least 23 , and
the subscripted operator v ∈2 q means that validator v is a
member of a set q which belongs to the type ′q2 that repre-
sents sets of weight at least 13 . In this proposition q1 and q2
have type ′q1 and q3 has type q2. This use of numbered “q”s
as both types and variables is confusing, but exactly follows
the Isabelle definition. While accountable safety is verified
for the most recent Casper, plausible liveness is only proven
for an earlier variant with different inter-validator messages.
Moreover, these proofs were developed in an older version of
Isabelle and already the proof of accountable safety cannot
be checked with Isabelle2017.
2.3 Mathematical Components and Toychain
We employ several existing Coq libraries which already for-
malized the majority of the mathematics we need to define
and reason about Casper. Mathematical Components [4] is a
Coq library based on packaging mathematical structures and
results in the form of Coq canonical structures, which can
be reused and specialized when required [13]. The library
was used by Gonthier et al. to capture finite group theory
and prove fundamental results in abstract algebra [14]. In
addition to structures from abstract algebra, the library also
contains encodings of and results about many standard data
structures, such as numbers, lists, and finite sets.
Toychain [6, 17] is a general formalization of blockchain
systems in Coq using the Mathematical Components library.
It defines blocks, forks, and distributed node state, but ab-
stracts from specific block proposal mechanisms and proce-
dures to let nodes decide between forks. Toychain represents
a block tree as a finite map from hashes to blocks. Toychain
describes the behavior of a blockchain system as a relation
between global states, and establishes that absent adversar-
ial interference, the canonical chain becomes known to all
nodes in the steady state. For example, the Toychain global
state is represented as a Coq record
Record World := mkW { localState : StateMap;
inFlightMsgs : seq Packet; consumedMsgs : seq Packet; }.
where localStatemaps node names to their current block tree
and other local data. We have extended and revised Toychain
in collaboration with its authors to support capturing full
realistic blockchain system specifications such as that for
Bitcoin [2]. Our model of Casper incorporates definitions
and lemmas from this extended version of Toychain.
3 Modeling and Verification Approach
This section outlines our approach to modeling and verifying
Casper in Coq.
We decided to translate Hirai’s Casper definitions and the-
orems [15] from Isabelle/HOL to Coq, and connect the result-
ing Casper definitions with key definitions from Toychain.
At the same time, we leveraged the Toychain definitions
and results to capture the behavior of nodes as found in the
Casper-based beacon chain for Ethereum [1]. For tractabil-
ity, we focused on translating and adapting Hirai’s formal
models with a static validator set, which are simpler (but less
realistic) than the corresponding models with churn among
validators.
We used concepts from the Mathematical Components li-
brary as far as possible. In particular, validators are identified
by fixed-size keys so we represent validators as members
of a finite type (having a finite number of members that
can be enumerated), written Validator : finType. Using the
library’s finType simplifies forming and reasoning about sets
of validators.
Since the formal model for establishing safety by Hirai
mostly uses first-order reasoning, we were able to success-
fully leverage the CoqHammer extension [3, 12] to perform
proofs in Coq that closely followed Isabelle/HOL proofs. At
the same time, we reformulated Isabelle locale variables to
Coq section variables.
In particular, the assumption on abstract set membership
becomes:
Variables quorum_1 quorum_2 : {set {set Validator}}.
Hypothesis qs : ∀ q1 q2, q1 ∈ quorum_1 → q2 ∈ quorum_1 →
∃ q3, q3 ∈ quorum_2 ∧ q3 \subset q1 ∧ q3 \subset q2.
quorum_1 abstracts the collection of sets of validators with
combined deposits (“weight”) of at least 23 of the total. A link
will be justified if every validator in some set in quorum_1 has
voted for the link. quorum_2 abstracts the collection of sets of
validators with combined deposits of at least 13 of the total.
Casper safety proofs generally show that an attack cannot
succeed without a set of attacking validators of at least this
size being slashed for it.
To abstract a block forest, we assume a parent relationship
on a type Hash (with member genesis).
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An individual validator v must not publish two
distinct votes,
⟨v, s1, t1,h(s1),h(t1)⟩ and ⟨v, s2, t2,h(s2),h(t2)⟩,
such that either:
I. h(t1) = h(t2). Equivalently, a validator must not
publish two distinct votes for the same target height.
II. h(s1) < h(s2) < h(t2) < h(t1). Equivalently, a validator
must not vote within the span of its other votes
Figure 1. Slashing Conditions of Casper
Variable hash_parent : rel Hash.
Hypothesis hash_at_most_one_parent : ∀ h1 h2 h3,
hash_parent h2 h1 → hash_parent h3 h1 → h2 = h3.
Given the block forest we define the global state as a function
which represents votes cast by validators:
Record State :=
mkSt { vote_msg : Validator → Hash → nat → nat → bool }.
The arguments are the validator making the vote, the hash
and height of the target block, and the height of the source
block. Blocks have at most one parent so the source hash of
any valid vote can be computed.
With votes defined we can then define the slashing condi-
tions of Casper (shown in Figure 1) in terms of conflicting
votes, and define a predicate saying a validator is slashed in
a given global state.
Definition slashed_dbl_vote s n :=
∃ h1 h2, h1 , h2 ∧ ∃ v s1 s2,
vote_msg s n h1 v s1 ∧ vote_msg s n h2 v s2.
Condition I is violated if validator n has voted for two edges
targeting different blocks h1 and h2 at height v.
Definition slashed_surround s n :=
∃ h1 h2 v1 v2 s1 s2, v1 > v2 ∧ s2 > s1
vote_msg s n h1 v1 s1 ∧ vote_msg s n h2 v2 s2.
Condition 2 is violated if validator n has made two votes
so the source height s1 and target height v1 of one strictly
surround the source height s2 to target height v2 range of
the other vote.
Definition slashed s n : Prop :=
slashed_dbl_vote s n ∨ slashed_surround s n.
A validator is slashed if it has violated either slashing condi-
tion.
We can also define justified links between blocks based
on the votes in a state:
Definition justified_link s q parent pre new now :=
q ∈ quorum_1 ∧ (∀ n, n ∈ q → vote_msg s n new now pre) ∧
now > pre ∧ nth_ancestor (now - pre) parent new.
The conjuncts respectively require that set q is large enough
to justify a link, that every validator in q has voted for this
link, that the claimed height now of the target is greater than
the claimed height pre of the source, and that parent is ac-
tually the ancestor the appropriate number of levels above
new.
This allows us to define justified blocks, starting from the
genesis block, and furthermore finalized blocks, as in the
Casper paper.
Inductive justified : State → Hash → nat → Prop :=
| orig : ∀ s, justified s genesis 0
| follow : ∀ s parent pre q new now,
justified s parent pre →
justified_link s q parent pre new now →
justified s new now.
Definition finalized s q h v child := justified s h v
∧ h <~ child ∧ justified_link s q h v child v.+1.
4 Accountable Safety
This section describes the Coq formalization and verifica-
tion of Casper’s accountable safety property. A major part
of the Casper design is ensuring that an attack cannot fi-
nalize blocks on both sides of a fork in the chain without
the attacker losing a significant amount of money by having
their validator deposits slashed. This is formalized as the
accountable safety theorem, which says that if two blocks
are finalized and neither is an ancestor of the other, then val-
idators having at least 13 of the deposits must have violated
the slashing conditions. The difference between slashing vi-
olations and actually losing funds is addressed and handled
with other countermeasures in the Casper paper [11].
Let hash_ancestor be the reflexive-transitive closure of the
hash_parent relation. Building on the definitions of validator
quorums and justification described above, we define a fork
in a state as two conflicting finalized blocks (hashes):
Definition fork s := ∃ h1 h2 q1 q2 v1 v2 c1 c2,
finalized s q1 h1 v1 c1 ∧ finalized s q2 h2 v2 c2 ∧
~ hash_ancestor h2 h1 ∧ ~ hash_ancestor h1 h2 ∧ h1 , h2.
With slashed s v capturing that the slashing conditions in
Figure 1 are true in state s for validator v, we define the
condition of 13 of validators by weight being slashed:
Definition quorum_slashed s :=
∃ q, q ∈ quorum_2 ∧ ∀ v, v ∈ q → slashed s v.
This allows us to define and prove accountable safety:
Theorem accountable_safety : ∀ s, fork s → quorum_slashed s.
The proof roughly follows the informal argument [11]. If the
two finalized blocks were at the same height then at least
1
3 weight (or a quorum_2 set) of validators violated slashing
condition I. Otherwise, consider the path of justified links
which justifies the higher finalized block. If any justified
block along this path has the same height as the other jus-
tified block or its justified immediate child then we again
have a sufficiently large set of validators violating slashing
condition I. Otherwise find the justified link along that path
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with a source lower than the other justified block and a target
higher than its child. Taking this link along with the justified
link between the lower finalized its child we have a set of
validators violating slashing condition II.
5 Plausible Liveness
The liveness goal for Casper is that as long as at least 23 of
validators are following the protocol and block proposals con-
tinue, then further checkpoints can continue to be finalized
regardless of the behavior of the less the 13 of misbehaving
validators, without needing any of the honest validators to
violate a slashing condition and sacrifice their deposit to
allow the chain to live.
Our Coq proof is based on the argument given in [11], and
also Yoichi Hirai’s Isabelle/HOL proof of plausible liveness
for an older variant of the Casper protocol [15].
5.1 Context
The proof workswith the samemodel of checkpoint blocks as
the accountable safety proof.We are given a set of checkpoint
block hashes, a parent relationship giving each hash at most
one parent, and a hash of the genesis block. The changing
part of the system states is only the set of votes, because
we do not model the block proposal process or dynamic
validator sets.
Finalization is an essential part of the Casper design for
dynamic validator sets, which uses finalized blocks as the
boundary of the “epochs” where the validator set can change.
Because of this essential role we state and prove liveness in
terms of a hash and height of the most recent previously-
finalized block, even though we are not yet proving liveness
in the presence of dynamic validator sets.
Variable epoch_start : Hash.
Variable epoch_height : nat.
Hypothesis epoch_ancestry :
nth_ancestor epoch_height genesis epoch_start.
Here epoch_start is the hash of that block, epoch_height is its
height, and epoch_ancestry is a proof that the epoch start block
is actually at the claimed height over the genesis block.
To demonstrate a further block can be finalized we only
need to consider justification of blocks descending from the
start of this epoch. We define justification within the epoch
as having a path of super-majority links from the epoch start
up to a block.
Inductive justified_this_epoch (st:State)
: Hash → nat → Prop :=
| epoch_justified :
justified_this_epoch st epoch_start epoch_height
| justfied_link : ∀ s s_h t t_h,
justified_this_epoch st s s_h →
hash_ancestor s t →
supermajority_link st s t s_h t_h →
justified_this_epoch st t t_h.
This definition defines justification inductively, from two
cases. A block is justified if it is the epoch start block, or if
it has a justified ancestor and a supermajority of validators
have voted for a link to this block from that ancestor.
Besides the parameterization over the epoch start block,
we do not actually consider the history of any past epochs. In
particular, we assume that the well-behaved nodes have not
made any votes with sources outside the current epoch. We
could work without that assumption, but we would need to
repeat part of the accountable safety proof to argue that an
unslashed validator’s votes from past epochs cannot prevent
them from safely making the votes chosen in out proof.
5.2 Theorem
To formalize a statement of plausible liveness, we follow
our examples and abstract away from any implementation
details of “following the protocol”, and simply require that
our 23 good validators have not made certain sorts of bad
votes. For the conclusion we also ignore the details of how
validators decide to make votes, and simply show that there
is some set of votes which the good validators could make
that would finalize a further block and not violate slashing
conditions.
In Hirai’s proof for the previous Casper design it was
sufficient to simply require that the good validators were
unslashed. The current Casper design intentionally removed
any slashing conditions that required knowing the state of
the chain when the votes were made. We found that one of
these conditions was essential to the proof, so our definition of
good behavior for the current Casper protocol requires that
a validator has not made votes with an unjustified source
in addition to requiring that a good validator had not been
slashed.
We define the condition that a super-majority of validators
is good given a set of votes:
Definition two_thirds_good (st : state) :=
∃ good_validators, good_validators ∈ quorum_1
∧ ∀ v, v ∈ good_validators
→ (~ slashed st v ∧ sources_justified st v).
The property sources_justified st v says the source block of
any vote that validator v has made in state st is justified
within the current epoch1
Definition sources_justified st v :=
∀ s t s_h t_h,
vote_msg st v s t s_h t_h →
hash_ancestor epoch_start s ∧ justified_this_epoch st s s_h.
The other explicit hypothesis of our plausible liveness the-
orem captures the assumption that block proposals continue.
We only need to assume that blocks can be found above the
highest justified block, but we may need to find a block at
arbitrary height. These definitions capture the properties
1This enforces the assumption above that good nodes only have votes with
sources within the current epoch
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of being the highest justified block (which will be unique
by accountable safety), and having descendants at arbitrary
heights.
Definition blocks_exist_high_over (base : Hash) : Prop :=
∀ n, ∃ block, nth_ancestor n base block.
Definition highest_justified st b b_h : Prop :=
∀ b' b_h', b_h' >= b_h
→ justified_this_epoch st b' b_h'
→ b' = b ∧ b_h' = b_h.
With these ingredients, this is the statement of plausible
liveness that we prove:
Lemma plausible_liveness :
∀ st, two_thirds_good st →
(∀ b b_h, highest_justified st b b_h
→ blocks_exist_high_over b) →
∃ st', unslashed_can_extend st st'
∧ no_new_slashed st st'
∧ ∃ (new_finalized new_final_child:Hash) new_height,
justified_this_epoch st' new_finalized new_height
∧ epoch_height < new_height
∧ new_finalized <~ new_final_child
∧ supermajority_link st' new_finalized new_final_child
new_height new_height.+1.
The desired conclusion of the theorem is expressed by
stating that there exists a set of votes st', such that any
votes which were not already in st were made by unslashed
validators, that no validators that were unslashed in st are
slashed in st', and that there is a block new_finalized which
is finalized under votes st' and is higher than the previous
finalized block.
The proof proceeds as outlined in [11]:We take the highest
justified checkpoint J which is a descendant of the most
recently finalized block, consider the maximum height of the
target of any existing vote, and use the assumption that block
proposals continue to find a descendant A of J at a greater
height than that, and an immediate child B of A. Then all
good validators will vote for the links J→A and A→B. This
is easily shown to finalize A and require votes only from
good validators. It remains only to prove that this does not
violate any slashing condition. Recall the definitions of the
slashing conditions from Figure 1.
• Condition I is not violated because a good validator’s
two new votes have targets at different heights, and
any previous votes have a target at a lower height than
A, by choice of A.
• Condition II is not violated because the two new votes
of good validators do not nest, a previous vote can-
not have a range surrounding a new vote because all
previous votes have targets below A by choice of A,
and a previous vote cannot nest within the vote for
J→A because it would have a source above J, we as-
sume existing votes from good validators have justified
sources, and J is the highest justified block.
5.3 Unslashed is not enough
One might wonder if a different voting strategy could prove
plausible liveness while only needing to require that the
good validators be unslashed. To show that there cannot be
such a proof, we give an example where all validators are
unslashed but it is impossible to justify any further blocks
(let alone finalize a further block). Every validator in this
example has made one vote with an unjustified source.
F
A1
A2
B1
B2
Figure 2. Unslashed Progress Counterexample
The example is shown in Figure 2. F is the most recent
finalized block, A1 and B1 immediate children of F , and A2
and B2 immediate children (respectively) of A1 and A2. Half
of the validators have voted for the edges F→A1 andA1→A2
(dotted arrows) and the other half of the validators have
voted for F→B1 and B1→B2 (dashed arrows). It is impossible
to make a super-majority link from F to any other block
without some validators being slashed. A new edge from F
to a block one or two levels above F would violate slashing
Condition I, because every validator already has votes with
a target at that level. An edge from F to a block at any higher
level would violate Condition II, with the inner vote being
that validator’s vote for A1→A2 or B1→B2.
6 Instantiating Hypotheses and
Parameters
The definitions and proven properties in the abstract models
of Casper are quite far from those in the Casper paper [11],
partly due to proof engineering concerns described above. To
bring our results closer to the paper, and thus to actual imple-
mentations, we instantiate the key abstractions. In particular,
we assume an arbitrary function which maps validators to
their deposits:
Variable deposit : Validator → nat.
Using the support for big operators in Mathematical Compo-
nents [10], we then define the total deposits of all validators:
Definition deposits := \sum_(v : Validator) (deposit v).
We also define a function from a natural number n to the set
of sets of validators which have total deposit at least n:
Definition gdset n := [set x in powerset [set: Validator] |
\sum_(v in x) (deposit v) >= n].
Writing m %/ d for the quotient of the Euclidean division of m
by d, we define two sets:
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Definition deposit_bot := gdset (deposits %/ 3).+1.
Definition deposit_top := gdset ((2 * deposits) %/ 3).+1.
which allows us to prove:
Lemma deposit_validator_intersection : ∀ q1 q2,
q1 ∈ deposit_top → q2 ∈ deposit_top →
∃ q3, q3 ∈ deposit_bot ∧ q3 \subset q1 ∧ q3 \subset q2.
using the arithmetical lemma
Lemma thirds : ∀ n, (n %/ 3).+1 + n <= 2 * (2 * n %/ 3).+1.
This intersection lemma shows that we can instantiate the
abstract quorum_1 and quorum_2 used in our proofs with specific
sets deposit_top and deposit_bot.
6.1 Block Trees and Transition System
Working from the other end of the abstraction spectrum, we
define functions and datatypes in Coq resembling those in
the beacon chain implementation [1], to be used when defin-
ing global system state and node-local behavior. In particular,
following Toychain, we abstracted a block to a Coq record
type containing, most notably, a hash of the previous block
and a collection of attestations by validators:
Record Attestation := mkAR { distance_src : nat;
attester : Validator; }.
Record Block := mkB { parent_hash : Hash;
attestations : seq Attestation;
distance : nat; }.
Using notions from the FCSL PCM library [5], we then define
block forests as finite maps from hashes to blocks:
Definition Blockforest := union_map Hash Block.
This allows us to instantiate a suitably concrete parent rela-
tion over hashes:
Definition hash_parent_bf (bf : Blockforest) : rel Hash :=
[rel x y | (x ∈ dom bf) && (y ∈ dom bf) &&
if find y bf is Some b then parent_hash b == x else false].
for which we can instantiate the desired hypothesis:
Lemma hash_parent_bf_eq : ∀ f h1 h2 h3,
hash_parent_bf f h2 h1 → hash_parent_bf f h3 h1 → h2 = h3.
We can now consider a block forest as a concrete global
state, and define a mapping from from block forests to a
vote_msg function:
Definition vote_msg_bf bf v h distance distance_src : bool :=
if find h bf is Some b then
(distance b == distance) &&
((mkAR distance_src v) ∈ attestations b)
else false.
The initial state of the system is simply the finite map taking
the genesis block hash to the genesis block:
mkSt (vote_msg_bf (#GenesisBlock \\→ GenesisBlock))
Finally, we define a transition system that given a block b,
updates the global state bf with b:
mkSt (vote_msg_bf (#b \\→ b \+ bf))
Accountable safety holds for every state in this transition
system, and we believe it can serve as a specification for the
Casper beacon chain implementation [1], and is closer to
the level of detail needed generate a correct-by-construction
implementation from the specification.
6.2 Beacon Node
The state of the beacon chain [1] is split into two main parts,
an active state and a crystallized state. The active state is up-
dated every block, while the crystallized state is only updated
according to a cycle length parameter of the protocol, which
is set to 64 slots in the beacon chain implementation [1].
In our Coq formulation, we define the state of a node in
the beacon chain as a record containing the blockforest and
this beacon chain state. It also includes other parameters of
the system, such as the cycle length mentioned above.
Record State {Hash : ordType} :=
Node {
id : NodeId;
peers : peers_t;
blocks : Blockforest;
cstate : @CrystallizedState Hash;
astate : @ActiveState Hash;
(* set to 1024 shards, see beacon chain implementation *)
shardCount : nat;
(* set to 64 slots, see beacon chain implementation *)
cycleLength : nat;
}.
When a block arrives on a node, the crystallized and active
states are updated via the state transition function speci-
fied in [1]. The update of the crystallized state is where
most of the Casper functionality occurs. Should the slot
number of the block be at least 64 past the last recalcula-
tion slot, the crystallized state is updated by applying the
rewards and penalties for the validators, as well as manag-
ing the justification and finalization of blocks. For exam-
ple, the Coq code for the state update has functions such as
applyRewardsAndPenalties below, which calculates and updates
the balances for all active validators given the current state
and block.
Definition applyRewardsAndPenalties
(crystallizedState :
@CrystallizedState [ordType of Hash])
(activeState : @ActiveState [ordType of Hash])
(blk : block)
(cycleLength : nat) :=
(* ... omitted ... *)
In addition to updating the crystallized and active states, the
arrived block is also appended to the block forest, and the
new state is returned, along with a message from the node
that received the block to all of its peers.
Definition procInt (st : @State [ordType of Hash])
(tr : InternalTransition) (ts : Timestamp) :=
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let: Node n prs bf cst ast cl := st in
match tr with
| BlockT b ⇒
let: parentBlock := get_block bf (parent_hash b) in
let: (crystallizedState, activeState) :=
computeStateTransition cst ast parentBlock b cl in
let: newBf := bfExtend bf b in
pair (Node n prs newBf crystallizedState activeState cl)
(emitBroadcast n prs (BlockMsg b))
end.
These definitions tighten the correspondence between our
Coq code and the Beacon chain implementation in [1]. Along
with our abstract safety and liveness proofs, these definitions
will allow us to perform verification at this low level, provid-
ing as much assurance as possible for the correctness of the
Casper protocol.
7 Conclusion
We presented a formalization of Casper in Coq, and proofs
of accountable safety and plausible liveness. These proofs
clarified the assumptions needed for the properties stated
in the Casper paper [11], especially what assumptions on
validator behavior are needed for plausible liveness. Our for-
malization work paves the way for transferring accountable
safety and plausible liveness from Hirai’s abstract models to
hold for steps over the Toychain global state according to a
step relation and node state definition matching those in the
Ethereum reference beacon chain node implementation [1].
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